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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
LAST CLEAR CHANCE IN PENNSYLVANIA-
AN OBSERVATION
In its broad application, the doctrine known as "last clear chance" provides
that a plaintiff who has negligently exposed himself to danger may nonetheless
recover for his injuries if the defendant could have avoided injuring him by the
exercise of reasonable care after he discovered or should have discovered plain-
tiff's peril. (See Restatement, Secs. 479, 480.) Though the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania has explicitly stated as recently as 1943 in Kasanovich vs. George,
348 Pa. 199, that "last clear chance" has never been 'the law in Pennsylvania,
the language of the Court in rejecting -the doctrine, is interesting. Mr. Justice
Stern, speaking for the Court, said:
"Nor has Pennsylvania adopted the doctrine of the 'last
clear chance' that, notwithstanding negli gence on the part of
the injured person, the tortfeasor will be held liable if, by
the exercise of reasonable care, he could have discovered the
peril to which the other had exposed himself, and then, by due
care, could have avoided the accident."
Was the failure to repudiate that branch of the doctrine sometimes referred
to as "conscious last clear chance," i. e., an affirmative act of ordinary negligence
after defendant has made actual discovery of plaintiff's peril, deliberate? What
was the factual situation in the Kasanovich case?
Plaintiff's decedent was walking alongside a track with his back turned
towards the direction from which a trolley was approaching. The motorman's
view was unobstructed, and he saw the decedent when the trolley was 200 feet
away. He ran into decedent and there was evidence that the brakes were not
applied until after the latter had been struck. The lower court granted de-
fendant's motion for a directed verdict, upon which judgment was entered. The
Supreme Court reversed, Justice Stern saying:
"In the present case there is no claim, nor the slightest
ground for belief, that the motorman intentionally ran into the
decedent. But the testimony offered by plaintiff would, if be-
lieved, have justified the jury in finding that the motorman
was guilty of a wanton disregard for decedent's safety. ...
"For decedent to have walked alongside the streetcar
track and in close proximity to it, with his back to approach-
ing cars, and without making the necessary observations to
protect himself, was so clearly negligence on his part which
contributed to the happening of the accident that the court
was justified in declaring it to be such as a matter of law.
"The real question in the case is whether plaintiff can
nevertheless recover in this action. . ..
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"Apparently all of the jurisdictions in which the ques-
tion has arisen have held that contributory negligence is not
a defense to an action for injury caused by reckless or wanton
misconduct on the part of the defendant .....
"Instead of giving binding instructions for defendant,
the learned trial judge should have instructed the jury that,
even if the motorman was grossly negligent, plaintiff, because
of decedent's contributory negligence, cannot recover, but that
such contributory negligence would not be a bar if the motor-
man was guilty of wanton misconduct .... "
Though there had been dicta in prior cases to like effect, Kasanovich was
the first Pennsylvania decision squarely ruling that contributory negligence is no
defense to an action predicated on defendant's wanton misconduct. What re-
lationship, if any, exists between this decision and the "last clear chance" prin-
ciple?
It is to be noted that the motorman had made no effort to stop until after
he had struck the plaintiff. This is a significant fact for it manifests a state of
mind indicating a consciousness of wrongdoing and a reckless indifference as to
the consequences of his acts. The definition of wantonness in the case is also
of interest:
"It must be understood, of course, that wanton mis-
conduct is something different from negligence however gross,
-different not merely in degree but in kind, and evincing a
different state of mind on the part of the tortfeasor. Negli-
gence consists of inattention or inadvertence, whereas wanton-
ness exists where the danger to the plaintiff, though realized,
is so recklessly disregarded that, even though there be no actual
intent, there is at least a willingness to inflict injury, a con-
scious indifference to the perpetration of the wrong."
If the "conscious" phase of the doctrine is applicable where defendant fails
to exercise ordinary care after actual discovery of the plaintiff's peril, then Kas-
anovich vs. George cannot fairly be said to represent an application of the doc-
trine either on its facts or in its definition of wantonness. A question that sug-
gests itself is this: suppose the motorman, after observing the plaintiff 200
feet away, had made no attempt to stop until he was within 50 feet of him, and
had then made an ineffectual attempt to stop, would the defendant be liable?
If an affirmative answer is given, then at least one aspect of "last clear chance"
would be law in Pennsylvania. Under these facts, defendant's conduct probably
could not be described as wanton, at least as that word is defined in Kasanovich
vs. George, for if an attempt was made to stop, it is doubtful whether the motor-
man's conduct could be said to indicate "a willingness to inflict injury."
The case of Cover vs. Hershey, 290 Pa. 551, is of particular interest in this
connection. The facts were as follows: Minor children, age 4 and 6 respectively,
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were trespassing on a railroad bridge. The evidence warranted the jury in find-
ing that the motorman of defendant's trolley car saw the children when he was
several hundred feet away from them. However, he made no effort to stop until
he was twenty-five feet away, and it was then too late to avoid running them
down. Recovery was allowed, and the Supreme Court said:
the . . . it was for the jury to say whether, after he saw
the children, he could have stopped the car before striking
them. If he could and neglected to do so it was a wanton act,
for he knew that the children had no other possible means
of escape. If on seeing their perilous position he failed to ex-
ercise reasonable care to avoid the accident, his conduct was
wanton within the meaning of the law." (Italics supplied)
It is to be observed that the definition of wantonness in the Cover and
Kasanovich cases differs substantially and materially. (1) Is the difference in
language due to the factual dissimilarity of the two cases? In the opinion of the
writer, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had no intention of modifying the
principles enunciated in the Cover case,. and the variation in definitions is due
to the difference in the facts of the two cases. Thus:
Cover vs. Hershey Kasanovich vs. George
1. Plaintiff was a trespasser on de- 1. Plaintiff was not a trespasser.
fendant's property. 2. Plaintiff was an adult.
2. Plaintiff was a child. 3. Plaintiff was guilty of contributory
3. Plaintiff could not be guilty of negligence.
contributory negligence.
Which of the three foregoing factual differences is the controlling element with
respect to the difference in definition of wanton misconduct? Certainly the dis-
tinguishing feature of the two cases cannot be the fact that plaintiff was a tres-
passer in the one case and not in the other, for the law treats trespassers less
generously than non-trespassers, and in the Cover case where the definition of
wantonness is less severe, the plaintiff was a trespasser. In Kasanovich where
the definition of wantonness requires a "willingness to inflict injury," the plain-
tiff was not a trespasser.
Is the fact that plaintiff in Cover was a child and in Kasanovich an adult,
the controlling difference? It may have been a factor based on the social philoso-
phy to protect children independently of the well-established difference in the
law of contributory negligence as applied to children and to adults.
However, the third factual difference would appear to be the significant one.
Where a plaintiff who is guilty of contributory negligence seeks to recover dam-
ages on the theory that defendant is guilty of wanton misconduct, in the writer's
opinion the definition of "wantonness" expressed in Kasanovich vs. George, will
be applied. When, however, an adult plaintiff is not guilty of contributory
negligence, but by reason of his being a trespasser on defendant's property, de-
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fendant is liable only for wanton misconduct, the definition of this phrase as
contained in Cover vs. Hershey will be applied insofar as an activity on the land
as distinguished from a condition on the land is concerned.
It would seem, therefore, that the omission of the "conscious" aspect of
"last clear chance" in the language contained in the Kasanovich case was not
motivated by any doubt in the Court's mind as to the absence in this state of the
doctrine of "last clear chance" in all its phases. Why, therefore, it may be asked
did Justice Stern only refer to one of the aspects of last clear chance? Well -
it's one of those things.'
ROBERT M. BERNSTEIN*
*Member of the Philadelphia Bar.
1For an excellent analysis of the meaning of "wanton conduct" in the Pennsylvania decisions, see
"Those Weasel Words-'Wilful and Wanton' ", 92 Univ. of Pa. Law Review 431.
